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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes a quantitative methodology for 
bounding the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) 
probabilities associated with a human-rated launch vehicle 
abort trigger (AT) that includes sensor data qualification 
(SDQ). In this context, an AT is a hardware and software 
mechanism designed to detect the existence of a specific 
abort condition. Also, SDQ is an algorithmic approach used 
to identify sensor data suspected of being corrupt so that 
suspect data does not adversely affect an AT’s detection 
capability. The FP and FN methodologies presented here 
were developed to support estimation of the probabilities of 
loss of crew and loss of mission for the Space Launch System 
(SLS) which is being developed by the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA). The paper provides a 
brief overview of system health management as being an 
extension of control theory; and describes how ATs and the 
calculation of FP and FN probabilities relate to this theory. 
The discussion leads to a detailed presentation of the FP and 
FN methodology and an example showing how the FP and 
FN calculations are performed. This detailed presentation 
includes a methodology for calculating the change in FP and 
FN probabilities that result from including SDQ in the AT 
architecture. To avoid proprietary and sensitive data issues, 
the example incorporates a mixture of open literature and 
fictitious reliability data. Results presented in the paper 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach in providing 
quantitative estimates that bound the probability of a FP or 
FN abort determination. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper describes a quantitative methodology for 
bounding the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) 
probabilities associated with abort triggers (ATs) that include 
sensor data qualification and constant abort detection 
thresholds during a given phase of flight. The methodology 
was developed to support the verification of design 
requirements for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS).  
Flight systems may have thousands of failure modes. These 
failure modes – typically identified via a failure modes and 
effects analysis (FMEA) – can be broadly classified as “hard” 
failures and “soft” failures. Hard failures occur rapidly and 
typically result in sustained large changes in the measured 
system states, e.g., a sensor failing to zero or to full-scale. 
Soft failures occur more slowly and typically result in gradual 
changes in the measured system states, e.g., a sensor drift that 
results in an intermediate value between zero and full-scale. 
Hard failures are fairly easy to detect while soft failures can 
be difficult to detect without significant FP and FN results. 
However, many failure modes are defined broadly enough 
that they are difficult to classify as either hard or soft failures. 
For example, a power supply failure may result in no power 
or reduced power depending on the exact nature of the failure. 
The uncertainty associated with understanding the impact of 
failures on the abort detection system provides motivation for 
bounding the FP and FN probabilities. A Monte-Carlo 
simulation and physics-based model of the system are 
typically used to estimate FP and FN rates. However, 
significant time and effort are required to develop the 
simulation and conduct this kind of analysis. A more cost-
effective and sufficiently accurate approach for SLS purposes 
is to use a simpler bounding estimate. In the approach 
proposed here, the failure rates and probabilities associated 
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with both soft failures and broadly-defined failure modes are 
first classified as failure-to-intermediate value (F2IV). F2IV 
values are then allocated to both failure to zero (F2Z) and 
failure to full-scale (F2FS). The aggregate F2Z and F2FS data 
then become the basis for calculating bounds on the FP and 
FN probabilities for a given AT. 
To facilitate the discussion embodied in this paper, a clear 
understanding of the following terms is necessary.  
Abort condition (AC): The state or behavior of a launch 
vehicle which indicates that a threat to the crew exists and 
that an abort response is required to mitigate the threat. A 
successful abort response during ascent enables the crew to 
escape from a failed or failing vehicle and return safely to 
Earth. 
Abort trigger (AT): A mechanism that is used to detect an AC. 
Each AT includes all of the hardware and software 
components required to detect a specific AC. The success or 
failure of an AT is ultimately measured by the probability that 
the crew returns safely to Earth when vehicle system failures 
threaten their safety. 
Defined below, two key attributes of an AT’s performance 
are the probability of a FP detection and the probability of a 
FN detection. Ideally, these probabilities will be zero or an 
acceptably low value.  
False positive (FP): Occurs when, despite the fact that an AC 
does not exist, the associated AT indicates that it has detected 
the AC and sends an abort recommendation. 
False negative (FN): Occurs when an AC exists and the 
associated AT does not detect the AC. 
Sensor data qualification (SDQ): This is software that 
monitors the sensor data at the Flight Computer (FC). It 
classifies data suspected of being corrupt as disqualified. 
Disqualified data are not used by ATs and, consequently, do 
not adversely affect an AT’s detection of its associated AC. 
SDQ is intended to reduce the probability of FPs and FNs. 
Abort Condition Detection Logic (ACDL): The ACDL is part 
of the AT software. On each FC, it compares the consolidated 
value to an AC detection threshold. If the consolidated value 
exceeds the threshold on a given FC for a pre-specified 
persistence period, that FC makes an immediate abort 
recommendation. 
Sensor data consolidation (SDC): These are algorithms that 
combine multiple time-synchronous measurements into a 
single data value that is typically used by higher-level 
operations and control algorithms, e.g. ADCL. 
This paper assumes that the threshold values used in abort 
detection result from analyses not discussed in this paper. 
From an academic point of view, the selection of abort 
detection thresholds has previously been addressed by a 
number of authors including Vachtsevanos, Lewis, Roemer, 
Hess, & Wu (2006). 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
overview of the theory behind fault management as an 
extension of control theory. It describes how this theory 
applies to ATs and the calculation of FP and FN probabilities. 
In Section 3, a methodology for calculating FP and FN 
probabilities for threshold-based ATs is described. Section 4 
presents an example showing how the FP and FN calculations 
are performed in practice using the methodology described in 
Sec. 3. Because actual SLS data cannot be disclosed for 
general publication, a combination of fictitious and open-
literature reliability data provide the basis for this example. 
In Sec. 5 Discussion, observations about the methodology 
and modifications toward improving the approach are 
discussed. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 6 
which gives a summary of the paper and briefly describes 
plans for applying the methodology to the SLS. 
2. BACKGROUND 
The term System Health Management (SHM) addresses 
activities that are described under several names, including: 
Prognostics and Health Management; Fault Protection; 
Vehicle Health Monitoring and Management; Fault 
Detection, Isolation, and Response; Diagnostics; 
Maintainability; Reliability; Availability; aspects of Safety; 
as well as others. SHM has historically been a relatively ad 
hoc set of processes and technologies focused on predicting, 
detecting, diagnosing, and responding to failures. The core 
idea that the operational aspects of SHM are related to control 
theory goes back 20 years (Albert, Alyea, Cooper, Johnson, 
& Ulrich, 1995). More recently, a unifying theory of SHM 
was developed and published (Johnson & Day, 2010) 
(Johnson & Day, 2011) (Johnson, 2011) (Day & Johnson, 
2014). This theory provides a conceptual framework for the 
field and for its operational subset, Fault Management (FM) 
theory. The unifying theory is based on the idea that FM 
theory and practice is essentially an extension of control 
theory and practice.  
The purpose of SHM is to provide capabilities to preserve a 
system’s ability to function as intended. SHM can be divided 
into passive capabilities such as design margins, and 
operational capabilities such as failure detection, isolation, 
and response (FDIR). These latter operational capabilities, 
termed Fault Management, are implemented as control loops, 
known as FM control loops (FMCLs). The FMCL detects 
system degradation or failure, and then determines which part 
of the system has failed or will fail (prognosis). Here, failure 
implies that all or part of the system cannot be controlled 
within acceptable limits to achieve its objectives. Having 
detected or predicted a failure, FMCLs then decide what 
control action (response) to take. The objective being to 
return the system to a controllable state or take an action to 
prevent or mitigate the predicted failure (Johnson, 2011).  
This extension to control theory is used in this paper to assess 
the failure detection portion of FMCLs in a human-rated 
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launch vehicle application. In control theory, state space 
control loops can be separated into two major portions: state 
estimation and state control. Calculation of overall control 
loop performance is also divided into two parts, with separate 
metrics to determine the performance of state estimation and 
state control. For FMCLs, state estimation can be measured 
and assessed using “confusion matrix” parameters: false 
positive (FP), false negative (FN), true positive (TP), and true 
negative (TN). State control success is based on the ability of 
the system to correctly determine the correct response action 
to take, and then assess the performance or effectiveness of 
that action. Effectiveness of the FM response typically 
estimated by comparing the speed of the FM response and the 
time available to correct for a current or impending failure. If 
the response completes before the failure effects 
compromises relevant systems goals, the response is 
effective; else, it is considered to be either less or not 
effective. This aspect of the use of ideas that extend control 
theory will not be pursued further in this paper. 
For human-rated launch vehicles (LV), the effectiveness of 
the FM mechanisms called ATs are measured in terms of 
their ability to protect the crew, which is estimated by 
determining the change in loss of crew (LOC) probability that 
occurs if an AT or suite of ATs is implemented. Taking 
classical control theory concepts of state estimation and state 
control, the metric of this change in LOC probability, the 
LOC Benefit, is calculated by subdividing it into state 
estimation and state control elements. These are calculated 
separately and used to calculate the LOC Benefit numbers 
associated with proposed AT implementations. The LOC 
Benefit value provides a quantitative basis for deciding which 
ATs will be provided on the human-rated LV and for 
measuring their effectiveness in particular scenarios and 
across all relevant scenarios.  
A human-rated LV can have many ATs with varying types of 
failure detection approaches. Calculation of the LOC Benefit 
contribution for each AT is key to an accurate accounting of 
the total LOC probability. The sum of the LOC Benefit of 
each AT across all relevant scenarios provides the LOC 
Benefit of the entire suite of ATs, which is the measure of 
their benefit to the system. 
3. FP AND FN METHODOLOGY 
In this section, a general methodology is briefly described for 
(a) quantitatively determining the performance of threshold-
based ATs used to detect abort conditions and (b) estimating 
the improvement or degradation of that performance due to 
the inclusion of SDQ (Maul, Melcher, Chicatelli, & Sowers, 
2006) as a component of the AT.  
Quantitatively estimating the probabilities of FP and FN 
abort detections is crucial. High FP and FN probabilities 
indicate that the AT has high loss of mission (LOM) costs, or 
is ineffective (i.e., fails to decrease Loss of Crew probability), 
and, hence, should not be incorporated into the design at all. 
A methodology for calculating FP and FN probabilities for 
threshold-based ATs is composed of the following five steps.  
1. Define the AT – Construct a functional block diagram 
integrating all of the hardware and software components 
included in the AT architecture. The diagram is useful 
for understanding the data flow from each sensor to the 
AC Detection Logic (ACDL).  
2. Analyze the Physics of Failure – Analyze how failures 
upstream of the ACDL can result in FP and FN 
detections. This analysis is helpful in understanding the 
effects of redundancy on the FP and FN probabilities of 
ATs. 
3. Determine Bounds on Component Failure Probabilities 
– Calculate the probability of failure for each component 
included in the AT architecture. Here, “component” is a 
general term used to describe the individual functional 
blocks that comprise the AT architecture, which in the 
case of SLS is composed of both hardware and software. 
A list of failure modes and their probability of 
occurrence are required to complete Step 4. 
4. Conduct Analysis of FP and FN Probabilities for the 
Baseline System – In this step, a fault tree (FT) is created 
to estimate the probability of a FP or FN abort detection 
based on the probability that known failure modes may 
occur. The FT is typically created using an available 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) software tool 
which is programmed to analyze the AT failure space.  
5. Determine the Benefit Provided by SDQ – This step is 
similar to Step 4, however, the analysis is focused on an 
AT architecture that includes the SDQ function. 
Resulting FP and FN abort probabilities are subtracted 
from those for the baseline AT calculations (step 4) to 
calculate the FP and FN benefit of the SDQ function.  
The novelty of this methodology is as follows. First, PRA and 
reliability block diagrams are applied to the failure detection 
problem of FP and FN. Second, the benefit of SDQ is 
estimated as part of a failure detection process. Third, these 
methods are developed and applied to the failure detection 
portion of FMCLs within the overall theory of SHM and FM. 
To see an example of performance calculations for entire 
FMCLs for the human-rated launch vehicle application; and 
thus, how the FP and FN calculations fit into the overall LOC 
benefit calculation, see (Lo, Johnson, & Breckenridge, 2014). 
In general, the calculations described in this paper are a key 
part of the LOC benefit analysis used to estimate the value of 
ATs. These calculations help to quantitatively determine 
whether or not SDQ algorithms are beneficial to ATs. This 
allows the AT design to be optimized and reduces 
unnecessary design complexity. 
4. APPLICATION OF FP AND FN METHODOLOGY 
In this section, the methodology described in Sec. 3 is applied 
to a generic AT designed to detect a low-pressure AC. The 
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description is provided as a practical example of how the FP 
and FN methodology may be used to detect and respond to 
an AC resulting, for instance, from a propellant leak. To 
avoid data proprietary and sensitivity issues associated with 
the SLS, actual SLS data are not used. Instead, a mixture of 
open literature and fictitious data are utilized. 
Human-rated flight hardware typically contains significant 
redundancy to protect the crew. The example is intended to 
illustrate that redundancy without duplicating it. Further, 
although the example presented here is intended to be simple 
for illustrative purposes, it should be fairly easy to see how 
the complexity of an AT in a real system can escalate. 
4.1. Step 1: Define the AT 
As a first step, it is necessary to identify all of the hardware 
and software components required to detect a specific AC. 
These components comprise the AT – both collectively and 
through the manner in which they are connected (i.e., the 
architecture). As part of the subsequent methodology for 
estimating SDQ benefit, a baseline AT that does not include 
SDQ is required. The baseline AT is used to determine the 
reduction in the FP and FN probabilities provided by SDQ. 
This is accomplished by comparing results for an AT that 
includes SDQ against results for a baseline AT.  
The main function of the AT presented here is to monitor a 
pressure and provide actionable knowledge to the crew so 
they can initiate an abort action if necessary. Low pressure 
conditions are a well-known issue for liquid-propellant-based 
LVs. Inordinately low propellant tank pressures during flight 
are indicative of a course of events that may result in 
catastrophic explosions with loss of the vehicle and/or crew. 
Figure 1 presents the baseline functional block diagram of the 
architecture for the threshold-based AT used in this paper. To 
facilitate the calculation of the SDQ benefit, the baseline 
architecture does not include the SDQ function. Figure. 2 
presents a block diagram for the same AT, but with the 
addition of SDQ. In the following discussion, previously 
undefined elements of the AT diagrams are described and the 
specific SDC implementation is detailed. 
Pressure Sensors (PSs): The AT architecture contains four 
(4) redundant pressure sensors – PS1, PS2, PS3, and PS4. 
Each pressure sensor transducer generates analog voltage 
signals proportional to the sensed pressure. Said signals are 
inputs to the Sensor Electronics (SE). PS1 and PS2 are 
connected to SE1, while PS3 and PS4 are similarly connected 
to SE2. 
Sensor Electronics (SEs): There are two sets of SEs which 
include (a) signal conditioning equipment required to power 
the pressure sensors, (b) hardware and firmware required to 
digitize and discretize the sensor’s analog signal, and (c) 
hardware and firmware required to interface to a digital data 
bus. The SE outputs for each sensor are cross-strapped to 
each of the FCs via the data buses. 
Flight Computers (FCs): There are three (3) FCs – FC1, FC2, 
and FC3. The FC functional block represents both hardware 
and software implemented to support operation of the launch 
vehicle.  
Sensor Data Consolidation (SDC): For the baseline system 
shown in Fig. 1, sensor measurements PS1, PS2, PS3, and 
PS4 are averaged on each FC to obtain a single consolidated 
measurement that is used by the ACDL. Averaging was 
selected as the SDC algorithm to simplify the example. Other 
approaches (e.g., mid value select) could be used in place of 
averaging. 
Some broad assumptions and ground rules that are used to 
analyze this example AT follow. 
 The mission time is 10 minutes or 0.166̅̅̅̅  hrs. 
Figure 2. AT+SDQ Architecture showing relevant 
components and data links 
Figure 1. AT Baseline Architecture showing relevant 
components and data links. 
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 During the mission, components are considered to be in 
either an operational or failed state. In other words, an 
AT with a degraded response is not considered. 
 The AT is single fault tolerant with respect to the SE and 
FC components:  
o At least one (1) properly functioning SE component 
is needed to complete the mission. 
o At least two (2) properly functioning FCs – includes 
both hardware and software components – are needed 
to complete the mission. 
 Additionally, the AT is two fault tolerant with respect to 
PS components. At least two (2) properly functioning 
PSs are needed to complete the mission. 
 Random part failure and the common cause failure 
(CCF) of redundant components are considered. 
 Single-point estimates, rather than distributions, are used 
to represent component failure rates. This simplifies the 
analysis and discussion of the results. 
 The limit of resolution of the analysis is at the component 
level. Analysis is not performed below that level. 
4.2. Step 2: Analyze the Physics of Failure 
Given a complete description of the components and 
architecture of the AT, the next step is to develop a clear 
understanding of the failure modes associated with those 
components and how the physics of failure may modify data 
used by the ACDL.  
Here, an approach based on Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) theory (Vachtsevanos, et al, 2006) is 
used. The analysis was first simplified by defining three 
classifications for the effect of failures. Then, the impact of 
each of those classifications on the probability of a FP or FN 
abort detection was explored. 
The probability of FP and FN aborts may be bounded by 
considering the following three common classifications for 
the effect of failures: Failure to Zero (F2Z), Failure to 
Intermediate Value (F2IV), and Failure to Full-Scale (F2FS). 
A discussion of each of these classifications follows and 
addresses the potential for the failure class to generate a FP 
or FN abort detection.  
Failure to Zero (F2Z) – Occurs when data associated with 
one or more of the PSs fails to a value at or near zero. Small 
variations about zero may result from improper sensor 
calibration or from ambient noise. Further, when averaging is 
the consolidation algorithm – see Eqs. (1) and (2) – this 
failure classification has the effect of driving both the 
consolidated measurement value, 𝑢𝑗,c, and the standard 
deviation of the consolidated measurement value, 𝜎𝑗,c, toward 
zero.  
 𝑢𝑗,c =
1
4
 ∑ 𝑢𝑗,𝑖
4
𝑖=1  (1) 
 𝜎𝑗,c =
1
4
 ∑ 𝜎𝑗,𝑖
4
𝑖=1  (2) 
Here, u represents a measured or calculated system state;  
indicates the standard deviation of u; i is an index associated 
with the individual data buses that deliver sensor data to the 
FCs; j is an index that indicates a specific FC; and “c” 
indicates that the associated value is the result of the SDC 
calculation. For the example presented in this paper, uj,i and 
j,i respectively represent the individual pressure 
measurements and their standard deviations. 
Failure to Full Scale (F2FS) – Occurs when data associated 
with one or more of the PSs fails to a value at or near full-
scale. F2FS will not contribute to a FP abort detection of low 
pressure. It may however, contribute to a FN abort detection 
if the following three conditions exist. 
 a system failure has occurred, and 
 the system failure results in a low pressure condition, and 
 the value of the pressure data, 𝑢𝑗,𝑖 , resulting from that 
failure are less than, yet sufficiently close to, the low 
pressure detection threshold, 𝑢TH. 
If these three conditions exist, then an F2FS of one or more 
pressure sensor data signals will result in a FN abort 
detection. 
Failure to Intermediate Value (F2IV) – This more 
complicated and often more likely case occurs when occurs 
when data associated with one or more of the PSs fails to  
values greater than zero but less than full-scale. This situation 
could be caused, for example, by a partially blocked sensing 
port or by intermittent short or open circuits. In reality, 
failures associated with this failure effect classification may 
or may not result in an AC. As a result, quantification of the 
FP and FN probabilities associated with these failures 
typically requires significant Monte Carlo analysis. Since 
tools and resources are not currently available to conduct the 
required analysis, other approaches are needed to estimate 
and bound the probabilities. One means of providing a 
conservative bound for assessing the FP rate is to attribute all 
of the F2IV failure rate to the F2Z classification. That is:  
 FR(F2Z)Upper Bound = FR(F2Z) + FR(F2IV),  (3)  
where FR is the failure rate. Reasoning in a similar (but 
“opposite” in terms of using the data) manner for FN, one 
means of providing a conservative bound for assessing the 
FN rate is to attribute all of the F2IV failure rate to the F2FS 
classification, so that:  
 FR(F2FS)Upper Bound = FR(F2FS) + FR(F2IV). (4)  
For the purposes of the analyses described in this report, all 
F2IV probabilities are estimated conservatively as F2Z for FP 
calculations and F2FS for FN calculations. This logic follows 
from the observations that assigning F2IV cases to F2Z will 
always create a FP, and assigning F2IV to F2FS for FN 
calculations will always create a FN. As F2IV cases will in 
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reality only sometimes create these conditions, but at rates 
difficult to predict, we deliberately create overestimates of FP 
and FN cases to ensure a conservative estimate. 
4.2.1. Failure to Zero and FP Analysis 
To show the impact of an F2Z on the ACDL, cases for the 
F2Z of 0, 1, and 2 sensors were examined. Relevant 
parameters are identified in Table 1. A nominal value of 
𝑢𝑖,nom = 40 pounds per square inch (psi) was selected for the 
pressure sensor and a value of 𝜎𝑖,nom = 0.75  psi for the 
standard deviation. For F2Z sensor signals, both the signal 
value and the signal standard deviation are assumed to be 
zero. To calculate the probability that the consolidated 
pressure is less than the AC detection threshold, a Gaussian 
probability distribution is assumed and an AT threshold, 
𝑢TH = 25 psi, is used. The results for each of the three cases 
examined are given in Table 2. Of primary interest are the 
consolidated values, 𝑢𝑗,c and 𝜎𝑗,c, and 𝑃(𝑢𝑗,c < 𝑢TH) which is 
the probability that an F2Z of the signals will result in a FP 
abort detection. 
Table 1. Parameters used in example AT for FP analysis. 
Variable Value Units Description 
𝑢𝑖,FS 60 psi Full-scale pressure 
𝑢𝑖,𝑛𝑜𝑚 40 psi Nominal pressure 
𝜎𝑖,𝑛𝑜𝑚 0.75 psi 
Standard deviation of 
nominal pressure 
𝑢TH 25 psi 
Detection threshold for low 
pressure AC 
Note here the effect of failures on the value of the 
consolidated signal. As more signals F2Z, both the 
consolidated signal value and the consolidated standard 
deviation move closer to zero. Also, for this example, an F2Z 
does not result in an overlap between the nominal and failed 
probability distributions as would be typical for F2IV. 
Further, Fig. 3 shows the probability distribution of the 
consolidated signal,  𝑢𝑗,c , for no F2Z signals, for one F2Z 
signal, and for two F2Z signals. An important observation 
from both Table 2 and Fig. 3 is that the AT is single fault 
tolerant. The F2Z of a single sensor data signal is not 
sufficient to cause a FP abort detection. The F2Z of two or 
more sensor data signals on the same FC are required to 
generate a FP abort detection.  
4.2.2. Failure to Full-scale and FN Analysis 
The impact of F2FS on the ACDL is illustrated by looking at 
cases for 0, 1, and 2 sensors failing to full-scale. As shown in 
Table 3, a nominal value of 𝑢𝑖,nom = 20 psi was selected for 
the pressure sensor and a value of 𝜎𝑖,nom = 0.75 psi for the 
standard deviation. The nominal value is assumed to be the 
result of an AC, as an AC must exist for a FN to occur. For 
F2FS sensor signals, the signal value and standard deviation 
are assumed to be 60 psi and 0.75 psi, respectively. To 
calculate the probability that the consolidated pressure is 
greater than the AC detection threshold, a Gaussian 
Figure 3. Probability distribution vs. pressure for 𝑢𝑗,c given 
0, 1, and 2 pressure signals failing to zero without the 
application of SDQ. 
Table 2. Impact of F2Z on example ACDL. 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
No. Data Values: 4 4 4 
No. Nominal Data 
Values: 
3 2 1 
No. F2Z Data Values: 1 2 3 
𝑢𝑗,1 40 40 40 
𝑢𝑗,2 40 40 0 
𝑢𝑗,3 40 0 0 
𝑢𝑗,4 0 0 0 
𝑢𝑗,c 30 20 10 
𝜎𝑗,1 0.75 0.75 0.75 
𝜎𝑗,2 0.75 0.75 0 
𝜎𝑗,3 0.75 0 0 
𝜎𝑗,4 0 0 0 
𝜎𝑗,c 0.56 0.38 0.19 
𝑃(𝑢𝑗,c < 𝑢TH): 3.08E-19 1.0000 1.0000 
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probability distribution and an AT threshold value of 
𝑢TH =  25 psi were also assumed. Results for each of the 
three cases examined are given in Table 4. Of primary interest 
are the consolidated values, 𝑢𝑗,c and 𝜎𝑗,c, and 𝑃(𝑢𝑗,c > 𝑢TH) 
which is the probability that an F2FS of the signals will result 
in a FN abort detection. 
Further, Fig. 4 shows the probability distribution of the 
consolidated signal,  𝑢𝑗,c , for the three cases. An important 
observation from both Table 4 and Fig. 4 is that, if the low 
pressure AC exists and the pressure is sufficiently close to the 
detection threshold, the F2FS of a single sensor is enough to 
generate a FN abort detection. 
4.3. Step 3: Determine Bounds on Component Failure 
Probabilities 
The overall goal of this step is to calculate the probability of 
failure for each component that is part of the AT architecture. 
The process for accomplishing this goal is described below. 
Step 3.1 Identify the failure modes and associated failure 
rates for each component in the AT architecture. Failure 
modes and failure rates (i.e., reliability data) are typically 
determined by referencing a system-specific failure modes 
and effects analysis or similar documents. Reliability data 
used in this paper are given in the first two cols. of Tables 5 
through 8. In Table 8, the FC software failure rates are 
presumed not to include the flight application software. 
Step 3.2 Classify the effect of each failure mode identified in 
Step 3.1 as F2Z, F2IV, or F2FS. This is typically 
accomplished through discussions with one or more subject 
matter experts who understand the failure modes and the 
impact of those failures on the data used to detect a given AC.  
Step 3.3 Conservative (i.e., upper) bounds for the 
component’s F2Z and F2FS probabilities are determined. To 
do this, failure rates classified as F2Z are only allocated to 
the F2Z rate (i.e., F2Z per hour). Those classified as F2FS are 
only allocated to the F2FS rate. And, those classified as F2IV 
are allocated to both the F2Z and F2FS rates. An example 
showing how this is done for the F2Z case is given in Table 
5 where, for the Electrical Short failure, the failure rate (col. 
2) is allocated to F2Z rate (col. 6), while a failure rate of zero 
is allocated to the F2FS rate (col. 7). Similarly, an example 
of how this is done for the F2FS case is shown in Table 6 
where, for the High Voltage failure, the failure rate (col. 2) is 
allocated to F2FS rate (col. 7), while a failure rate of zero is 
allocated to the F2Z rate (col. 6). Finally, an example 
showing allocation for the F2IV case is given in Table 5 
where, for the degraded failure, the failure rate is allocated to 
both the F2Z rate and the F2FS rate. 
Step 3.4 Calculate the F2Z and F2FS total failure rates for 
each component by summing the rates for each failure mode 
in cols. 6 and 7, respectively. In Table 5, the total F2Z rate is 
4.2E-05 failures per hour and the F2FS rate is 3.16E-05 
Table 3. Impact of F2FS on example ADCL. 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
No. Data Values: 4 4 4 
No. Nominal Data 
Values: 
3 2 1 
No. F2FS Data Values: 1 2 3 
𝑢𝑗,1 20 20 20 
𝑢𝑗,2 20 20 60 
𝑢𝑗,3 20 60 60 
𝑢𝑗,4 60 60 60 
𝑢𝑗,c 30 40 50 
𝜎𝑗,c 0.75 0.75 0.75 
𝑃(𝑢𝑗,c > 𝑢TH): 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
Figure 4. Probability distribution vs. pressure for 𝑢𝑗,c given 
0, 1, and 2 pressure signals failing to full-scale without the 
application of SDQ. 
Table 4. Parameters used in example AT for FN 
analysis. 
Variable Value Units Description 
𝑢𝑖,FS 60 psi Full-scale pressure 
𝑢𝑖,𝑛𝑜𝑚 20 psi Nominal pressure 
𝜎𝑖,𝑛𝑜𝑚 0.75 psi 
Standard deviation of 
nominal pressure 
𝑢TH 25 psi 
Detection threshold for low 
pressure AC 
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failures per hour. These are shown in the totals row in cols. 6 
and 7, respectively. 
Step 3.5 Multiply the conservative total failure rate for the 
F2Z and F2FS classifications by the time in the mission phase 
to obtain the probability of failure for each classification. The 
goal of this step is to calculate the probability of F2Z and 
F2FS for each of the components represented in Tables 5 
through 8. To do that, the failure rates calculated in the 
previous step are multiplied by the operating time–for this 
example 10 minutes or 0.166̅̅̅̅  hours is assumed. Results for 
probability of failure calculations are given in the last row of 
cols. 6 and 7 in each of the failure mode tables. 
When appropriate, Steps 3.1 through 3.5 may be repeated for 
each mission phase. 
4.4. Step 4: Conduct Analysis of FP and FN Probabilities 
for the Baseline System 
In this Section, the methodologies and modeling approaches 
used to derive the probability of a FP and a FN abort 
recommendation are discussed. A FT analysis methodology 
was used to provide a systematic means of identifying system 
component failure events that lead to these undesired 
recommendations.  
4.4.1. Fault Tree Development 
FT models were constructed using the NASA fault tree 
analysis guidelines (Stamatelatos and Homayoon, 2011). The 
Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated 
Table 5. Failure modes for the example PS showing the contribution of each failure mode to conservative bounds for F2Z 
and F2FS classifications. 
   
Quantitative impact of failure mode 
on the component output signal 
Conservative 
Upper Bound 
Failure Mode 
Failures per 
hour 
F2Z F2FS F2IV 
F2Z per 
hour 
F2FS per 
hour 
Electrical Short 3.500E-06 X     3.500E-06 0.000E+00 
No Output 6.900E-06 X     6.900E-06 0.000E+00 
Cracked or Fractured 3.500E-06     X 3.500E-06 3.500E-06 
Degraded 2.810E-05     X 2.810E-05 2.810E-05 
Totals: 4.200E-05  Totals: 4.200E-05 3.160E-05 
   Operating Hours: 0.1667 0.1667 
   Probability of Failure: 7.000E-06 5.267E-06 
 
Table 6. Failure modes for the example SE showing the contribution of each failure mode to conservative bounds for F2Z 
and F2FS classifications. 
   
Quantitative impact of failure mode 
on the component output signal 
Conservative 
Upper Bounds 
Failure Mode 
Failures per 
hour 
F2Z F2FS F2IV 
F2Z per 
hour 
F2FS per 
hour 
Defective Component 4.290E-07 X     4.290E-07 0.000E+00 
Fails During Operation 1.430E-07     X 1.430E-07 1.430E-07 
Connection Failure 7.133E-08 X     7.133E-08 0.000E+00 
Failed to Operate 7.133E-08 X     7.133E-08 0.000E+00 
High Voltage 7.133E-08   X   0.000E+00 7.133E-08 
Improper Output 7.133E-08     X 7.133E-08 7.133E-08 
Inoperative 7.133E-08 X     7.133E-08 0.000E+00 
Logic Fault 7.133E-08     X 7.133E-08 7.133E-08 
Totals: 1.000E-06  Totals: 9.287E-07 3.570E-07 
     Operating Hours: 0.1667 0.1667 
   Probability of Failure: 1.548E-07 5.950E-08 
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Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) software was used to 
generate the failure combination of events that lead to a FP 
or FN abort recommendation, quantify probability of those 
recommendations, and identify the major failure contributors 
or risk drivers to those recommendations. SAPHIRE is a 
publically-available, government-developed software tool 
that is useful for performing Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA). SAPHIRE is documented in a number of reports 
including a summary manual by the NRC (Wood, Smith, 
Kvarfordt, & Beck, 2008). The SAPHIRE FT is not shown 
due to complexity and space limitations. 
4.4.2. Common Cause Event Modeling 
Common Cause Failure (CCF) events are accounted for in the 
SAPHIRE FT model. CCFs have been shown by many 
reliability studies to contribute significantly to the overall 
unreliability of complex systems. A CCF event is defined as 
the failure of multiple redundant components due to shared 
causes. The incorporation of CCF events into the FT model 
results in more realistic estimates of system unreliability. In 
this work, CCF events are modeled in the FT to account for 
the possible failure of AT components due to external causes. 
For example, multiple FCs might fail simultaneously or 
generate erroneous signal output indicating the occurrence of 
an abnormal system state. This type of failure event can be 
caused by loose connections of interface cables. Cable 
connection errors can be attributed to installation or assembly 
errors (human error), high levels of vibration during launch 
vehicle ascent, or by design faults in FC hardware, firmware 
or software. To reduce the underestimation of probabilities 
for FP and FN abort recommendations, combinations of 
multiple CCF events were considered for each AT 
Table 7. Failure modes for the example FC hardware showing the contribution of each failure mode to conservative bounds 
for F2Z and F2FS classifications. 
   
Quantitative impact of failure mode 
on the component output signal 
Conservative Upper 
Bounds 
Failure Mode 
Failures per 
Hour 
F2Z F2FS F2IV 
F2Z per 
Hour 
F2FS per 
Hour 
Power Supply Failure 1.540E-05 X     1.540E-05 0.000E+00 
I/O Board Failure 7.700E-06     X 7.700E-06 7.700E-06 
Processor Failure 3.850E-05     X 3.850E-05 3.850E-05 
Data Bus Failure 1.540E-05 X     1.540E-05 0.000E+00 
Totals: 7.700E-05  Totals: 7.700E-05 4.620E-05 
   Operating Hours: 0.1667 0.1667 
   Probability of Failure: 1.283E-05 7.700E-06 
 
Table 8. Failure modes for the example FC software showing the contribution of each failure mode to conservative bounds 
for F2Z and F2FS classifications. 
   
Quantitative impact of failure mode 
on the component output signal 
Conservative 
Upper Bounds 
Failure Mode 
Failures per 
hour 
F2Z F2FS F2IV 
F2Z per 
hour 
F2FS per 
hour 
Computational 1.350E-06     X 1.350E-06 1.350E-06 
Logic 1.710E-06     X 1.710E-06 1.710E-06 
Data I/O 7.300E-07     X 7.300E-07 7.300E-07 
Data Handling 1.090E-06     X 1.090E-06 1.090E-06 
Interface 9.800E-07     X 9.800E-07 9.800E-07 
Data Definition 7.300E-07     X 7.300E-07 7.300E-07 
Data Base 2.470E-06     X 2.470E-06 2.470E-06 
Other 9.400E-07     X 9.400E-07 9.400E-07 
Totals: 1.000E-05  Totals: 1.000E-05 1.000E-05 
   Operating Hours: 0.1667 0.1667 
   Probability of Failure: 1.667E-06 1.667E-06 
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component. The CCF probability 
equations (Mosleh, Rasmuson, & 
Marshall, 1998) and associated alpha 
factor values (Atwood, Kelly, 
Marshall, Prawdzik, & Stetkar 1996) 
used in this study are given in Table 9.  
4.4.3. Estimation Approach for FP 
and FN Abort Detection 
The methodology in this section is 
developed by first considering the FN 
case. The occurrence of a FN detection 
depends on the occurrence of two 
events. 
1. A system failure of sufficient 
magnitude to exceed prescribed 
detection thresholds and 
2. A failure of the AT to detect that 
system failure.  
The occurrence of a FN event may then be represented using 
the following Boolean algebraic expression: 
 FN = AC ∩ AT|AC. (5) 
Here, FN is true if an abnormality event occurred and an abort 
trigger occurred given that an abort condition is true. 
The probability of a FN event is given by, 
 
P(FN) = P(AC ∩ AT|AC)
                  = P(AC) x P(AT|AC).
 (6) 
Here P(AC) denotes the probability of an AC and P(AT|AC) 
denotes the conditional probability of failure of the AT given 
that an AC event has occurred.  
If various ACs are considered, a general expression for the 
overall system probability of a FN detection can be obtained 
by applying the additive rule of probability as shown below. 
This expression assumes the occurrences of FN scenarios are 
mutually exclusive. 
 P(FN) = ∑ P(AC𝑘) x P(AT|AC𝑘)
𝑛
𝑘=1  (7) 
For the remainder of this paper, 
ACk = 1 implies that the 
probability a given AC will occur 
was accounted for as part of a 
separate analysis. This approach 
has the added benefit that the 
structure and failure logic of FP 
and FN events become identical. 
As a consequence, the SAPHIRE 
model and results used to analyze 
a FN abort recommendation may 
also be used to estimate the 
probability of a FP abort 
recommendation.  
For each AT component, Table 10 lists the success 
configuration (i.e., the minimum redundancy required) and 
the single-point failure rates to be used in conducting 
reliability analyses for both F2Z and F2FS. Success 
configurations are based on the assumptions stated at the end 
of Sec. 4.1. For components other than SDQ, single-point 
failure rates were obtained from the bounded F2Z and F2FS 
failure rates listed in Tables 5 through 8. Failure rates were 
not available for SDQ, so a failure rate equivalent to the FC 
software failure rate was assumed. Although this is believed 
to be a very conservative estimate, it is useful for explaining 
the FP and FN methodology. 
4.4.4. Probabilistic Risk and Reliability Analysis 
After constructing the FT and entering the required data for 
the component and CCF probability estimates into 
SAPHIRE, the software can be used to perform probabilistic 
risk and reliability analysis. SAPHIRE initially performs a 
FT reduction using Boolean reduction techniques. FT 
reduction is performed to eliminate redundant basic failure 
events so as to avoid over estimation of top event probability. 
The results of FT reduction are a set of basic failure events 
Table 9. CCF probability equations and  values for CCF alpha factor model (non-
staggered testing scheme). 
Success Configuration  
(k-out of- n) 
Common Cause Failure 
Probability Equations 
α factor 
Values 
1 out 2 
(CCSE) 
P(CCF_2) = α
2 
/
 
1.0257 x P
t
 
α
1 
= 0.97430 
α
2 
= 0.02570 
2 out 3 
(FC Hardware 
/FC Software) 
P(CCF_2)= 1/2* x α
2 
/ 1.0303 x P
t
 
P(CCF_3) = α
3 
/
 
1.0303 x P
t
 
α
1 
= 0.97550 
α
2 
= 0.01870 
α
3
= 0.00579 
2 of 4 
(PS) 
P(CCF_2)
 
= 1/3 x α
2 
/
 
1.0376  x P
t
 
P(CCF_3)
 
= 1/3 x α
3 
/
 
1.0376  x P
t
 
P(CCF_4)
 
= α
4 
/
 
1.0376 x P
t
 
α
1 
= 0.97410 
α
2
= 0.01700 
α
3
= 0.00589 
α
4
= 0.00298 
 
Table 10. Individual component failure rates for F2Z and F2FS 
 
AT Component PS SE 
FC 
Hardware 
FC 
Software SDQ 
 Success Configuration 2 out 4 1 out 2 2 out 3 2 out 3 2 out 3 
       
F
2
Z
 
Failure Rate 
(failures/hour) 
4.2E-05 8.57E-07 7.70E-05 1.00E-05 1.00E-05 
       
F
2
F
S
 
Failure Rate 
(failures/hour) 
3.16E-06 3.57E-07 4.62E-05 1.00E-05 1.00E-05 
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that, should they occur, lead to the 
top event occurring. In this paper, 
members of this set of events are 
called Minimal Cut Sets (MCS) or 
Risk Drivers (RDs). 
The FP and FN probabilities of 
occurrence obtained from SAPHIRE 
are shown in Tables 11 and 12, 
respectively. To consolidate the data 
for presentation, results for both the 
AT baseline and the AT+SDQ 
architectures are given in the same 
table. All of the risk drivers in these 
tables are CCF events associated 
with the AT’s redundant 
components. For this example, the 
probability of random component 
failure is negligible. The data, which 
represents the top risk drivers for 
each classification, will be discussed 
in more detail in Sec. 4.5. 
4.5. Step 5: Determine the Benefit 
Provided by SDQ Algorithms 
The overall goal of this step is to 
determine the benefit provided by 
SDQ. For this example, the SDQ 
algorithm would be composed of 
two thresholds. One threshold near 
zero to detect F2Z and one near full-
scale to detect F2FS.  
The goal of this step is accomplished 
by calculating probability of a FP or 
FN abort for the AT+SDQ 
architecture and comparing the 
results to those for the baseline AT 
architecture. In a process similar to 
that used to analyze baseline AT, 
calculation of the SDQ FP and FN 
probabilities and the SDQ benefit 
may be achieved as follows: 
Step 5.1 Revise the baseline AT 
architecture to include SDQ. The 
revised architecture is shown in Fig. 
2. 
Step 5.2 Analyze the physics of 
failure for the AT+SDQ 
architecture. This can be 
accomplished with a cursory review 
of Figs. 3 and 4 and Tables 2 and 4. 
If SDQ successfully identifies and 
disqualifies the failed signal, the 
shift in the consolidated signal value 
Table 11. Top risk drivers for an AT FP detection due to F2Z. 
Set No. 
AT Baseline 
FP Probability 
AT+SDQ 
FP Probability Basic Event Description 
1 1.19E-07 1.19E-07 FC1 & FC2 hardware CCF 
2 1.19E-07 1.19E-07 FC1 & FC3 hardware CCF 
3 1.19E-07 1.19E-07 FC2 & FC3 hardware CCF 
4 7.39E-08 7.39E-08 FC1, FC2, & FC3 hardware CCF 
5 2.06E-08 2.06E-08 PS1, PS2, PS3, & PS4 CCF 
6 1.55E-08 1.55E-08 FC1 & FC2 software CCF 
7 1.55E-08 1.55E-08 FC1 & FC3 software CCF 
8 1.55E-08 1.55E-08 FC2 & FC3 software CCF 
9 1.36E-08 1.36E-08 PS1, PS2, & PS3 CCF 
10 1.36E-08 1.36E-08 PS1, PS2, & PS4 CCF 
11 1.36E-08 1.36E-08 PS1, PS3, & PS4 CCF 
12 1.36E-08 1.36E-08 PS2, PS3, & PS4 CCF 
13 9.60E-09 9.60E-09 FC1, F2, & FC3 software CCF 
14 N/A 4.92E-09 SDQ1, SDQ2, SDQ3, & SDQ4 CCF 
15 3.67E-09 3.67E-09 SE1 & SE2 CCF 
16 N/A 3.24E-09 SDQ1, SDQ2, & SDQ3 CCF 
17 N/A 3.24E-09 SDQ1, SDQ2, & SDQ4 CCF 
18 N/A 3.24E-09 SDQ1, SDQ3, & SDQ4 CCF 
19 N/A 3.24E-09 SDQ2, SDQ3, & SDQ4 CCF 
 
Table 12. Top risk drivers for an AT FN detection by the AT due to F2FS. 
Set No. 
AT Baseline 
FN Probability 
AT+SDQ 
FN Probability Basic Event Description 
1 7.16E-08 7.16E-08 FC1 & FC2 hardware CCF 
2 7.16E-08 7.16E-08 FC1 & FC3 hardware CCF 
3 7.16E-08 7.16E-08 FC2 & FC3 hardware CCF 
4 4.44E-08 4.44E-08 FC1, FC2, & FC3 hardware CCF 
5 1.55E-08 1.55E-08 PS1, PS2, PS3, & PS4 CCF 
6 1.55E-08 1.55E-08 FC1 & FC2 software CCF 
7 1.55E-08 1.55E-08 FC1 & FC3 software CCF 
8 1.55E-08 1.55E-08 FC2 & FC3 software CCF 
9 1.02E-08 1.02E-08 PS1, PS2, & PS3 CCF 
10 1.02E-08 1.02E-08 PS1, PS2, & PS4 CCF 
11 1.02E-08 1.02E-08 PS1, PS3, & PS4 CCF 
12 1.02E-08 1.02E-08 PS2, PS3, & PS4 CCF 
13 9.60E-09 9.60E-09 FC1, F2, & FC3 software CCF 
14 N/A  4.92E-09 SDQ1, SDQ2, SDQ3, & SDQ4 CCF 
15 N/A 3.24E-09 SDQ1, SDQ2, & SDQ3 CCF 
16 N/A 3.24E-09 SDQ1, SDQ2, & SDQ4 CCF 
17 N/A 3.24E-09 SDQ1, SDQ3, & SDQ4 CCF 
18 N/A 3.24E-09 SDQ2, SDQ3, & SDQ4 CCF 
19 1.53E-09 1.53E-09 SE1 & SE2 CCF 
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required to generate a FP or FN abort detection will not exist. 
As a result, the probability of a FP abort detection due to a 
double failure or a FN abort detection due to a single failure 
then changes from a certainty to zero. 
Step 5.3 Create and analyze an FT for the AT+SDQ 
architecture. This can be accomplished by revising the 
baseline FT in SAPHIRE to include SDQ components and 
related failure data. Then perform the SAPHIRE analysis to 
identify cut sets that are the top risk drivers for this 
architecture. 
As noted previously, the FP and FN probabilities of 
occurrence obtained from SAPHIRE are shown in Tables 11 
and 12, respectively. These data represent the top risk drivers 
for the FP and FN classifications. In both of these tables, risk 
drivers are numbered as shown in column 1. For each of these 
cut sets, FP or FN probabilities for the AT baseline 
architecture is given in column 2; while probabilities for the 
AT+SDQ architecture are given in column 3. Column 4 lists 
the basic failure events that are the cause of the FP or FN 
abort detection. 
Step 5.4 Determine the net SDQ benefit – the reduction in FP 
and FN probabilities that results from including SDQ in the 
AT architecture.  
First, calculate the FP and FN probabilities for the AT 
Baseline. For the example used in this paper, this is 
accomplished by summing the values in column 2 of Tables 
11 and 12. Results of these calculations are given in row 2 of 
Table 13. 
Second, determine the SDQ benefit by identifying risk 
drivers that will be mitigated by SDQ and separately 
summing the FP and FN probabilities associated with those 
risk drivers. Risk drivers mitigated by SDQ are typically 
associated with components downstream – in terms of 
information flow – of the SDQ component. For the example 
used in this paper, SDQ mitigated risk drivers are identified 
in Tables 11 and 12 by cells with a gray background. The 
SDQ FP benefit is obtained from Table 11 by summing the 
values in column 3 (or column 2 since the values are the 
same) for only the gray cells. A similar calculation is applied 
to Table 12 to obtain the SDQ FN benefit. Results of these 
calculations are given as SDQ benefits in row 3 of Table 13. 
Third, the addition of SDQ to the AT architecture comes at 
the cost of increasing the FP and FN probabilities. The SDQ 
cost is determined by identifying the risk drivers added by 
SDQ and summing the probabilities of those risk drivers. 
SDQ risk drivers are identified by italicized text in Tables 11 
and 12. The FP SDQ cost is then determined by summing the 
probabilities (Table 11, column 3) for the identified SDQ risk 
drivers. A similar calculation is applied to Table 12 to obtain 
the FN SDQ cost. The FP and FN SDQ costs are given in row 
4 of Table 13. 
Finally, metrics for the SDQ benefit can be calculated as 
shown in Eqs. 8 and 9.  
 Net SDQ Benefit = SDQ Benefit - SDQ Cost (8) 
 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝐷𝑄 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 % = 100 ×  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝐷𝑄 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑇 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒
 (9) 
Using Eq. 8, the net SDQ benefit to the FP probability may 
be calculated by subtracting the FP SDQ cost from the FP 
SDQ benefit. Similarly, the net SDQ benefit to the FN 
probability may be calculated by subtracting the FN SDQ 
cost from the FN SDQ benefit. The percent improvement in 
the FP and FN net SDQ benefit over the baseline AT may 
then be calculated using Eq. 9 in conjunction with the 
previously calculated values in Table 13. The FP and FN 
results of for Eqs. 8 and 9 are given in the next to last row and 
last row of Table 13, respectively. 
5. DISCUSSION 
Some observations based on data resulting from application 
of the FP and FN methodology to the example application are 
given in this Section.  
First, because this methodology uses a conservative upper 
bound for the component failure rates, the FP and FN 
probabilities for the AT baseline and AT+SDQ architecture 
are also upper bounds. This means that the actual FP and FN 
rates and probabilities will likely be less than those presented 
in the first two rows of Table 13. The practical significance 
of the estimate is that if the upper bound values meet 
requirements for FP and FN probabilities, then more detailed 
FP and FN analyses are not needed. 
Second, the methodology presented used single-point 
probability estimates for the reliability analysis. The analysis 
could be made more rigorous by performing the analysis with 
probability distributions instead of the single-point estimates. 
Another observation is that, a significant amount of 
uncertainty in the failure rates results from the classification 
Table 13. Summary of SDQ benefit calculations for AT 
FP and FN detections. 
   FP FN 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 AT Baseline  5.66E-07 3.73E-07 
SDQ 
Benefit 
7.87E-08 5.63E-08 
SDQ Cost 1.79E-08 1.79E-08 
N
et
 S
D
Q
 
 B
en
ef
it
 
Probability 6.08E-08 3.84E-08 
%  10.7% 10.3% 
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process that was applied. The sum of the F2IV for each 
component is essentially the failure rate uncertainty for that 
component. For example, in Table 8, all of the FC software 
failure modes are characterized as F2IV resulting in a failure 
rate uncertainty of 100% for that component. Proper 
classification of the failure modes is necessary to ensure that 
the uncertainty in the FP and FN probabilities is minimized 
and the accuracy maximized. Another option might be to 
consider a different classification approach. 
The impact of the SDQ failure rate used in the example 
application is another important consideration. Given that the 
failure rate for SDQ is likely to be lower than that for the 
flight software, one might consider the bounding case where 
the SDQ failure rate and resulting cost are both zero. In that 
case, the SDQ Benefit given in row 4 of Table 13 becomes 
the upper bound for the net SDQ Benefit.  
The methodology could also be expanded to examine the 
uncertainty in the net SDQ Benefit by considering the case 
where failure rates associated with F2IV are allocated to 
neither F2Z nor F2FS. Results for FTs associated with these 
cases could be compared to those already presented to arrive 
at an uncertainty bound for the net SDQ FP and FN benefits. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper presented a methodology that was developed to 
calculate quantitative bounded estimates of the false positive 
(FP) and false negative (FN) detection probabilities for an 
abort trigger (AT) with sensor data qualification (SDQ) and 
a constant abort threshold during a given flight phase. To 
illustrate the methodology, an example application was given 
that included the type of redundancy typically found in 
human space flight hardware and software. The example 
starts with the definition of the AT architecture. It then 
analyzes the AT’s physics of failure to arrive at three failure 
classifications: failure to zero, failure to intermediate value, 
and failure to full scale. These classifications are used to 
bound the component failure rates. Using the Systems 
Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability 
Evaluations (SAPHIRE) software, a fault tree is created that 
captures the component failure modes. The SAPHIRE fault 
tree is used in concert with the single-point estimates for the 
failure rates, and parametric common cause failure models to 
conduct a risk and reliability analysis as a means to identify 
the probabilities of and top risk drivers for FP and FN abort 
detections. Finally, reliability analysis results for a baseline 
AT without SDQ are compared to an AT that includes SDQ 
components. This provides a means of determining the net 
SDQ benefit in terms of reduced FP and FN probabilities of 
abort detection. 
Observations resulting from the example application and 
ways to improve the methodology are also discussed. Two 
key means of improving the methodology are: (1) replacing 
single-point probability estimates with probability 
distributions and (2) by a more detailed investigation of the 
impact on the methodology of uncertainty in the component 
failure rates. 
Current plans are to apply a version of this methodology to 
all SLS threshold-based ATs with the intent of refining 
calculations for loss of mission and loss of crew probabilities. 
Further, these calculations are and will be used to select the 
appropriate ATs for the vehicle, the SDQ algorithms for the 
ATs, and for verification and validation of the AT designs. 
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NOMENCLATURE (ACRONYMS) 
AC abort condition 
AT abort trigger 
ACDL abort condition detection logic 
CCF common cause failure 
F2FS failure to full-scale 
F2IV failure to intermediate value 
F2Z failure to zero 
FC flight computer 
FDIR fault detection, isolation, and response 
FM fault management 
FMCL fault management control loops 
FN false negative 
FP false positive 
FT fault tree 
LOC loss of crew 
LOM loss of mission 
LV launch vehicle 
NRC nuclear regulatory commission 
PRA probabilistic risk assessment 
PS pressure sensor 
ROC receiver operator characteristic 
SAPHIRE systems analysis programs for hands-on 
integrated reliability evaluations 
SDC sensor data consolidation 
SDQ sensor data qualification 
SE sensor electronics 
SHM systems health management 
SLS Space Launch System 
TN true negative 
TP true positive 
psi pounds per square inch 
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